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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CALVIN MOORE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20050072-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Calvin Moore relies on his opening brief and also refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the standard of review, the 
case, and the facts. Mr. Moore otherwise responds to the State's answer to his opening 
brief on the jury instruction issue as follows. (The jury instruction issue is Point V in Mr. 
Moore's Opening Brief and Point III in the State's Brief.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Moore maintains his previously stated arguments in his opening brief. 
In this reply brief, he addresses the issue concerning whether the jury was improperly 
instructed on both aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. In sum, the confusing and 
conflicting jury instructions defined aggravated assault in a manner which allowed the 
jury to improperly convict him of both the greater offense (aggravated burglary) and the 
lesser included offense (aggravated assault). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CONFUSING AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
INSTRUCTIONS IMPROPERLY ALLOWED A CONVICTION FOR A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
The State claims that because trial counsel agreed to the jury instructions, the 
instructions may not be raised under the theory of invited error. See Appellee's Brief, 
page 23 (citing State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16). While case law apparently supports 
its invited error argument, the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) still 
allows this Court to review the jury instruction issue. Invited error is a basis different 
than IAC and the State does not contend otherwise. 
The gravamen of the State's argument is that "jurors convicted defendant of 
second degree aggravated assault because he 'intentionally causefd] serious bodily injury 
to another' - e.g., Marcus Anderson. See Jury Instruction 32, R. 291[.]" Appellee's Brief, 
page 26 (footnote omitted). The State relies on the above language from Jury Instruction 
32 to argue that "[t]his element is not necessary to defendant's aggravated burglary 
conviction." Appellee's Brief, page 26; cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b)(^/rJ 
degree Aggravated Assault requires use of "a dangerous weapon ... or other means of 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury"). 
Under the State's argument and its reading of State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 
1985), it claims the Aggravated Assault element of "uses a dangerous weapon... or other 
means of force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury" is inapplicable to Mr. 
Moore's case because the jury would have had no occasion to consider such language. 
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In contrast to the State's claim, however, the plain language of the jury instructions 
demand otherwise. Mr. Moore's jury was in fact instructed on the Aggravated Assault 
definition that contained the alleged inapplicable language. Jury Instruction 31 expressly 
defined Aggravated Assault as follows: 
A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits assault and 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
Jury Instruction 31, R 290 (emphasis added) (attached hereto as Addendum 2). 
Since Jury Instruction 31 told the jury that the underscored language constituted 
Aggravated Assault, R 290, and Jury Instruction 26 similarly allowed such language to 
provide the basis for Aggravated Burglary, R 285, Addendum 2, once the jury convicted 
Moore of the greater charge they may have similarly believed that Aggravated Assault 
was simultaneously established. Accordingly, the Bradley analysis applies and the lesser 
included offense should be vacated. State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985). Trial 
counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the instructions. 
In Mr. Moore's case, Aggravated Assault was inadequately defined for the jury. 
"The parties are 'entitled to ... a presentation of the case to the jury under instructions that 
clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues and the law applicable thereto so that the 
jury will understand its duties." Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 274-75 
(Utah 1992) (explaining that trial court's failure to simplify and clarify jury instructions 
3 
resulted in confusing instructions that "may well have prejudiced [appellant's]... case."); 
Pollack v. State, 2002 FL 2264 (Fla. App. 2002) ("An instruction which tends to confuse 
rather than enlighten the jury is cause for reversal if it may have misled the jury and 
caused them to arrive at a conclusion that otherwise they would not have reached."). 
Jury Instruction 31 defined Aggravated Assault in a manner which allowed the 
jurors to convict Mr. Moore of both the greater and the lesser included offense, R. 290, 
Addendum 2, while Jury Instruction 26 and 32 defined Aggravated Assault under a 
different alternative theory. R 285, 291, Addendum. Instructions 26, 31 and 32 conflict 
with one another. 
For no error to occur, the definition of Aggravated Assault under Jury Instruction 
31 would have had to be rendered superfluous by the jury (or this Court). But such a 
result is precluded under the well-established rule that jury instructions must be construed 
as a whole. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1146 (Utah 1989). The jury is not 
allowed to ignore one instruction in favor of another. See R 262 (Jury Instruction 3). 
Moreover, "[njothing in these specific sentences or in the charge as a whole makes 
clear to the jury that one of these contradictory instructions carries more weight than the 
other. Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm 
instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing court has no way of 
knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their 
verdict. Francis v. Franklin, All U.S. 307, 322 (1985). 
"It is not sufficient for the jury instruction merely to be susceptible to an 
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interpretation that is technically correct. The important question is whether there is a 
'reasonable likelihood' that the jury was misled or confused by the instruction, and 
therefore applied it in a way that violated the Constitution. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 
1 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Cage v. 
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39,41(1990) ("In construing the instruction, we consider how 
reasonable jurors could have understood the charge as a whole."). 
Trial counsel was ineffective. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 1f 20, 94 P.3d 211. His 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and but for counsel's 
failure to object to the instruction the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id.; 
Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Moore respectfully requests that his convictions 
be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. In the alternative, he 
asks this Court to vacate the lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault. 
DATED this % day of May, 2006. 
Ronalq Fujino 
Attorney for Mr. Moore 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM 1 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (l)(b) Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Amended by Chapter 291,1995 General Session 
ADDENDUM 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits assault and 
..in or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force likeh » produce death or 
serious bodily injury. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, of the offense of Aggravated 
Burglary as charged in count I of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 5th day of February, 2003, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, entered or remained in the dwelling of Marcus 
Anderson and Antionette Ragsdale; and 
2. That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and 
3. That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit an assault on 
any person; and 
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant or 
another participant in the crime either: 
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon 
against any person who is not a participant in the crime. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
I * ; l O i . '*' N* i 
Assault, as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. '. f 
Utah, the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, assaulted Marcus Anderson; and 
2. That the said defendant intentionally or knowingly assaulted Marcus Anderson; 
and 
3. That the said defendant then and there intentionally caused serious bodily injury 
toft lai • : i :i s \ ndi : s • : > i: • ' 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
ti in ith : i sach and ' * "ie foregoing elements beyond a reasonable d rt the t 
find the defendant guilw o; Aggravated Assault as charged in count ii r-\ Jie information. . i 
the oti-jr hand. >n. - ••- i *^ convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
forego;.kL c ' • ist fin ::! the defendant :i : 
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